People have questioned some of Willie Fritz's decisions over the years, like the one to go for it on fourth down at the start of the fourth quarter against SMU instead of kicking a sure field goal, but he has never done anything anywhere close to as absurd as Jay Hopson punting on fourth-and-16 from the Tulane 46 with a few seconds left than 7 minutes remaining with a 30-13 deficit in the Armed Forces Bowl.
When I asked him about it after the game, I thought he might snap at me because he already had been questioned about at least two other strategical decisions by other reporters, but he gave me a long, thought-out, calm answer. The only problem was it made no sense. I can't let this pass:
"There was about 6:25 on the clock (actually nearly 30 seconds more, but he is hurting his case), and I am always looking into it. When I looked I knew they were going to try to run the clock out and what I thought there was that we could save our timeouts, we would stop them and get the ball back with about four minutes with an opportunity to score. Then it gives us, in case we didn't get the ball on the onside kick, we would get to stop them again. It is hard to get two onside kicks. I was looking at those six minutes and trying to steal three possessions. I knew we would have to have a short field to score that one as if we lost the ball there and they punted they would back us up to the 2-yard line. I felt in my heart we could still get three possessions."
My head is still spinning from that answer. They needed three scores and had the ball on Tulane's side of the 50. The difficulty of converting a fourth-and-16 with a stiff backup quarterback is still not as tough as getting the ball back and scoring three times in the last four minutes.
When I asked him about it after the game, I thought he might snap at me because he already had been questioned about at least two other strategical decisions by other reporters, but he gave me a long, thought-out, calm answer. The only problem was it made no sense. I can't let this pass:
"There was about 6:25 on the clock (actually nearly 30 seconds more, but he is hurting his case), and I am always looking into it. When I looked I knew they were going to try to run the clock out and what I thought there was that we could save our timeouts, we would stop them and get the ball back with about four minutes with an opportunity to score. Then it gives us, in case we didn't get the ball on the onside kick, we would get to stop them again. It is hard to get two onside kicks. I was looking at those six minutes and trying to steal three possessions. I knew we would have to have a short field to score that one as if we lost the ball there and they punted they would back us up to the 2-yard line. I felt in my heart we could still get three possessions."
My head is still spinning from that answer. They needed three scores and had the ball on Tulane's side of the 50. The difficulty of converting a fourth-and-16 with a stiff backup quarterback is still not as tough as getting the ball back and scoring three times in the last four minutes.
